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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 21, Number 3, Spring 1983
Testifying About Testimony: Psychological Evidence
on Perceptual and Memory Factors Affecting the
Credibility of Testimony
Charles L. Convis*
Almost seventy-five years ago, Hugo Munsterberg' wrote that
the teacher, the physician, the artist, the economist, the politician,
the military officer, and the minister were ready to accept the re-
sults of experimental psychology, translated into an applied psy-
chology. Only the lawyer was obdurate. He stated that the applica-
tion of psychology to the witness testifying in court was "an
absurdly neglected field which demands the full attention of the
social'community. ' '2 Initially, Wigmore5 had reservations, but later,
in setting out proposed guidelines for the admission of evidence, he
wrote, "[a]n expert psychologist may testify to a witness' mental
condition and testimonial trustworthiness."4 In 1940, Wigmore
wrote,
If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses,
the law will run to meet it. Both law and practice permit the calling of any
expert scientist whose method is acknowledged in his science to be a sound
* B.S., 1951, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 1956, Harvard Law School; Ph.D.,
1980, Educational Psychology, University of Texas at Austin. The author is a visiting Assis-
tant Professor at Duquesne University School of Law and is a member of the California,
Pennsylvania, and Texas Bars.
1. H. MUNSTERBERO, ON THE WrrNEss STAND (1908).
2. Id. at 12.
3. Wigmore, Professor Munsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L. REv.
399 (1909).
4. J. Wigmore, Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in the Next Century, in 1 LAw, A CEN-
TURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935 at 360 (A. Reppy ed. 1937).
Duquesne Law Review
and trustworthy one. Whenever the Psychologist is ready for the Courts, the
Courts are ready for him.6
The law's response to psychology has not been consistent with this
sanguine prediction.
Medical evidence of a witness' capacity to testify has long been
admitted, the insane and the idiot not being allowed to testify. But
when the issue is credibility, the weight to be given testimony,
courts are reluctant to admit extrinsic evidence, and often limit
the aggrieved party to cross-examination. 6 The distinction between
capacity and credibility and its effect on the form of admissible
evidence has been mentioned.
[C]ross-examination is the only method permitted absent abnormality due
to insanity or organic changes resulting from accident, disease, or the use of
drugs or liquor; otherwise the trial might be converted to a mental clinic
and too many collateral issues might be introduced .... But, where such
abnormality does exist extrinsic evidence is freely admissible.
7 .
Sometimes, the distinction between capacity and credibility is
blurred, but the usual result - that extrinsic evidence is only al-
lowed in severe disorders - is unchanged.8
A California courts drew an interesting distinction between evi-
dence about perception and memory and evidence offered to im-
peach a witness' veracity. The court recognized a judicial extension
of the statutory grounds for impeachment, namely, evidence of
mental derangement or mental disease. Then in a reversal of the
general rule, the court held that the impeachment evidence was
limited to cross-examination, but it allowed extrinsic evidence
about the effect of heroin use on perception and memory. A Texas
court"0 also allowed extrinsic evidence which did not relate to in-
5. J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 368 (3d ed. 1940).
6. State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. 677, 419 A.2d 866 (1979); Smith v. United States, 389
A.2d 1356 (D.C. 1978).
7. Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Mo. App. 1944).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850 (1974) where the court stated:
Generally, expert testimony as to the credibility of a witness is admissible if the sub-
ject matter involves organic or mental disorders, such as insanity, hallucinations,
nymphomania, retrograde amnesia, and testimony concerning physical maladies
which tend to impair mental or physical faculties. If however, the characteristic at-
tacked does not involve some organic or mental disorder or some impairment of the
mental or physical faculties by injury, disease, or otherwise, expert testimony is usu-
ally excluded.
Id. at 765, 208 S.E.2d at 853; See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 684 (1968).
9. People v. Bell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 7, 291 P.2d 150 (1955).
10. Bouldin v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 419, 222 S.W. 555 (1920).
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sanity or to a severe organic or mental disorder. The court held
that a witness' mental capacity and intelligence are important fac-
tors in credibility, and, even if one could not prove insanity or idi-
ocy, extrinsic evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes.
The court drew an analogy to the admission of evidence that a wit-
ness was drunk when observing the events to which he testified.
Two other cases appear to be precursors to the idea that an at-
tack on a witness' credibility based on psychological factors such as
perceptual or memory defects or unusual emotional involvement
should not be limited to cross-examination. In one," a medical wit-
ness was permitted to testify that the rape victim-witness was be-
low average in mental development and that he considered her "a
child." In the other, 12 medical witnesses were permitted to testify
that a rape victim-witness was, in their opinion, a "pathological
falsifier, a nymphomaniac, and a sexual pervert." The two cases
illustrate one example, criminal sexual behavior, where extrinsic
evidence is often admitted about another witness' credibility.
There are probably two reasons for this. First, the complaining
witness is usually the only witness other than the accused. Second,
unconscious determinants which only a psychoanalyst could dis-
cover might make a witness mistaken, although not a perjurer.
Some writers"3 advocate compulsory psychiatric examinations of
the complaining witness in sex crime cases, and courts sometimes
require such examinations.1
4
In spite of these early indications that expert testimony about
another witness' credibility would be considered, it has been diffi-
cult to get such evidence admitted in cases other than sex crimes.
For example, some criminal defendants whose cases turn on eye-
witness identification have offered psychological evidence about
perceptual and memory factors which raise questions of reliability
in such identification. Apparently this evidence is usually ex-
11. Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916).
12. People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929). The court determined that:
The testimony should have been received, not in extenuation of rape, but for its bear-
ing upon the question of the weight to be accorded the testimony of the girl and the
question of whether the mind of the girl was so warped by sexual contemplation and
desires as to lead her to accept the imagined as real, or to fabricate a claimed sexual
experience.
Id. at 431, 224 N.W. at 388.
13. Orenstein, Examination of the Complaining Witness in a Criminal Court, 107
Am. J. PSYCHATRY 684 (1951); Wigmore, supra note 5, at 460.
14. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968).
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cluded.15 Psychological evidence has also been excluded about the
defendant's susceptibility to inducement in an entrapment case,16
the defendant's capacity to commit the type of crime with which
he was charged,'17 and psycholinguistic evidence about stylistic
comparisons of known writings and utterances of the defendant
with those contained in writings and tape recordings offered into
evidence by the government. 8
While trial judges have wide discretion in the admission of ex-
pert testimony, e appellate courts, in affirming rulings refusing
such admission, usually advance reasons such as: (1) avoiding in-
terference with the functon of the jury; (2) avoiding a battle of the
experts; (3) refusing to open a floodgate that would admit expert
testimony on all issues; or (4) avoiding time-consuming side issues.
The last three reasons have not deterred courts from admitting ex-
pert testimony, including psychological testimony, in criminal
cases where insanity is an issue and in civil cases where injury or
disability is an issue. It would appear that only the first of the rea-
sons, avoiding interference with the function of the jury, merits se-
15. See, e.g., State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Iowa 1979) referring to twenty
cases from federal courts and state courts in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New York. See also United States v. Sims, 617
F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Hicks, 7 M.J. 561 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275 (C.M.A.
1977); State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 601 P.2d 1125 (1979); State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465
(R.I. 1979). The appellate decisions affirm trial court rulings barring the evidence. Rulings
admitting such evidence would not normally be in issue on appeal. See D. Fishman & E.
Loftus, Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 4 LAW & PSYCHOL-
OGY REV. 87, 96 n.30 (1978) for three cases in trial courts in Michigan, New York, and Wis-
consin in which the defendant was permitted to offer such evidence. See also Loftus &
Monahan, Trial By Data: Psychological Research as Legal Evidence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
270 (1980) for a report that one of the writers had testified "on about 30 occasions at crimi-
nal trials regarding ability of people to perceive and recall complex events and to identify
persons .... "
16. United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977).
17. Douglas v. United States, 386 A.2d 289 (1978).
18. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
19. It appears that one of the seldom stated assumptions underlying the trial judge's
discretion may have some question about it. This is the assumption that the jury has some
collective intuition which, when brought to bear in a particular case, produces a just result.
This assumption was examined by presenting fourteen questions, each relevant to a juror's
common sense understanding about human behavior in the identification of persons to 265
subjects in three samples in Washington, Nebraska, and Washington, D.C. Deffenbacher &
Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior, 6
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982). While the overall results exceeded chance levels, they were
not very impressive. On only two items, the effect of stress on perception and memory and
the effect of leading questions on response accuracy, was there any significant support for
the concept of a common, shared understanding.
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rious discussion.
One writer states, "[i]t is submitted, therefore, that the objection
based upon the 'province of the jury' is no more than a shibboleth
which, if accepted, would deprive the jury of important informa-
tion, useful and perhaps necessary for a proper decision on a diffi-
cult issue."20 This statement seems too general for all cases as
there is an area in adjudication when the jury should be protected
from those outside influences likely to impress them to the extent
that the outside influence effectively determines the verdict. This
question about the relation of expert testimony to the function of
the jury is not easy to answer. A consideration of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, including its genesis and extension to other jurisdic-
tions, might be helpful.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were approved by the United
States Supreme Court in 1972, reviewed by both branches of Con-
gress, and enacted into law effective July 1, 1973.1 The wording of
Rule 702 was unchanged during this review. It reads: "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. i2 This language suggests that the jury's province is less
exclusive than some appellate judges think. It is not required that
a question be unanswerable by the trier of fact before expert testi-
mony can be admitted, but only that such testimony will be of as-
sistance. The reference to assisting the trier of fact to understand
the evidence appears to welcome psychological testimony about
other witnesses' credibility, just as Munsterberg and Wigmore ad-
vocated. Finally, the last two words of the rule, "may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise," makes it clear that
expert witnesses are no longer limited to answering hypothetical
questions as they approach the ultimate facts which the trier of
fact must decide. These last two words should make the rule par-
ticularly welcome in those courts where trial judges have long
struggled with the feeling that by the time the hypothetical ques-
tion is finished the jury has often forgotten its beginning and never
knows to what the expert's opinion relates.
The last two words also suggest an additional liberalization,
20. P. WALL, EYE-WrrNSs IDENTIFICATION IN CRImINAL CASES (1975).
21. 88 Stat. 1926, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (1975).
22. FED. R. EvD. 702.
1983
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more relevant to the topic of this article. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note accompanying Rule 702, in referring to the last two
words, stated, "[t]he rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on
the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or
other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to
apply them to the facts. '23 If one witness testified that a traffic
light was green and another that it was yellow, and if the first had
a blue-yellow color blindness, a condition that a psychologist could
detect and discuss, the rule would appear to permit the psycholo-
gist to testify. He could give "a dissertation or exposition of scien-
tific principles" about perceptual defects or individual differences
in perception "relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to ap-
ply them to the facts."'
4
Sometimes an appellate court advances, as a specific reason for
excluding expert psychological evidence, the fear that the jury will
be overwhelmed by the witness' expertise and will abdicate its
factfinding responsibility. This reason would appear invalid when
opposing parties each offer such evidence. Even if the evidence
comes from only one party, there appear to be two reasons why the
fear is unfounded. First, most jurors probably consider themselves
better amateur psychologists than amateur physicians, chemists, or
metallurgists. They are likely to be less swayed by testimony about
perception and memory than by testimony about cervical discs,
thermosetting plastics, and Rockwell hardness numbers. Second,
the usual instructions from the judge remind the jury that they are
the sole judges of the facts, that they are not bound by the testi-
mony of an expert witness but should give it the weight to which
they think it entitled, and, when the witness gives an opinion, they
may consider the reasons advanced in support of the opinion. One
writer, in referring to pretrial identification through police lineups
and photograph examination, suggests that the problem is not un-
due deference to the expert, but undue reliance on an inherently
unreliable procedure, and, to overcome that problem, he advocates
the admission of expert psychological testimony.25
The extensive support for Rule 702 is indicated, not only by the
fact that it passed congressional review unchanged, but also by its
23. FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee note.
24. See Mitchell, Opinion, Expert Testimony Rules Have Major Impact on State
Law, 53 NEB. L. RPv. 417, 418 (1974), "The meaning, and therefore the significance of 'or
otherwise' is unlimited and warrants imaginative consideration." Id. at 418.
25. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unre-
liability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969 (1977).
584 Vol. 21:579
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extension to other jurisdictions. It has been adopted verbatim in
several states.2" Florida 7 and Nevada2 8 have adopted rules with
minor changes from the wording in Rule 702. It is reported29 that
Rule 702 has been adopted verbatim in Alaska, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Montana, and Washington. It is also reported 0 that rules of
evidence closely patterned on the Federal Rules but without the
exact wording of Rule 702 have been adopted in Michigan and Pu-
•erto Rico, and that Texas and Vermont are considering the adop-
tion of rules patterned on the Federal Rules. The Military Rules of
Evidence also repeat Rule 702 verbatim. 1 It appears, then, that
the rule is a popular one and contains a statement about the ad-
mission of expert testimony agreeable to the legislatures or courts
in about half the country. Rules of evidence can come into being
either through legislation or through the courts' rulemaking or ad-
judicative powers.
However the rule is made, the question whether psychological
testimony is admissible on perceptual and memory factors affect-
ing the credibility of other testimony is an important one.
Borchard 2 discussed several cases in which eyewitness testimony
in the identification of persons was crucial in the conviction of the
innocent. These include:
Payne Boyd, convicted of murder in West Virginia in 1925. A
black man, Cleveland Boyd, killed a deputy sheriff and then fled.
Six years later, a black man, who said he was Payne Boyd from
26. ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1976), Rule 702; HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 626-1 (1981), Rule 702; ME. R. Evin. 702; MINN. R. Evm. 702; NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-702
(1977), Rule 702; N.M. R. Evw. 702; N.D. R. Evm. 702; Omo R. Evm. 702; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2702 (West 1978); S.D. CoDwm LAws ANN. § 19-15-2 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
907.02 (West 1974); Wyo. R. EVID. 702; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, app. VI, § 702 (1972).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 1976) provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to the
evidence at trial.
Id.
28. NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.275 (1971). "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge." Id.
29. 4 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NEws 75 (J. Schmertz ed. 1979).
30. Id.
31. Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEWS 7703.
32. E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
1983
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North Carolina and had never been in the West Virginia county
where the crime occurred, was tried for the murder. He was con-
victed, retried after a reversal on grounds unconnected with the
identification issue, and convicted again. Sixty-nine witnesses,
twenty-four for the prosecution and forty-five for the defense, tes-
tified on the issue of identification. The second conviction was also
reversed, and fingerprint evidence at the third trial proved the ac-
cused innocent. After three trials and eighteen months in custody,
Payne Boyd was finally free."8 Two things about Borchard's report
suggest that psychological testimony might help avoid such a re-
sult today. First, it appears that most, if not all, of the defense
eyewitnesses were black, and most, if not all, of the prosecution
eyewitnesses were white. Same-race identification is known to be
more accurate than cross-racial identification." Second, perception
and memory are enhanced when visual images are associated with
verbal labels.." Perhaps the prosecution witnesses were more posi-
tive than usual that Payne Boyd was the man they had known as
Cleveland Boyd because the men had the same last name.
Andrew Toth, convicted of murder in Pennsylvania in 1891.
The victim was beaten to death in a labor disturbance involving
over five hundred persons. Toth was identified in a lineup when he
laughed at the prosecuting witness as the witness stumbled awk-
wardly. The real murderer was also named Toth and lived in the
same boardinghouse as the man wrongfully convicted. 6 It does not
appear from Borchard's account whether an emotional response of
the prosecuting witness at being laughed at, or the name-residence
coincidence contributed to the false identification, but it does ap-
pear that psychological evidence might have helped avoid the im-
prisonment of an innocent man for nearly twenty years.
33. Id. at 22-27.
34. Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition For Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. PEMsON-
ALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 330 (1969). But see United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th
Cir. 1978) where, following a thorough voir dire examination of a psychology professor, the
court ruled testimony on cross-racial identification inadmissible as of little assistance to the
jury. In affirming, the appellate court mentioned the broad discretion of the trial judge.
35. Kurtz & Hovland, The Effect of Verbalization During Observation of Stimulus
Objects Upon Accuracy of Recognition and Recall, 45 J. EXPzRIMENrAL PSYCHOLOGY 157
(1953); Warren & Horn, What Does Naming a Picture Do? Effects of Prior Picture Naming
on Recognition of Identical and Same-Name Alternatives, 10 MEMORY & CoGNmON 167
(1982). But see Davies, Milne, & Glennie, On the Significance of "Double Encoding" for the
Superior Recall of Pictures to Names, 25 Q.J. ExPamumrrAL PSYCHOLOGY 413 (1973), where
it is suggested that the fact that dual encoding occurred is not as important as the subject's
active participation in generating the verbal label.
36. E. BORCHARD, supra note 32, at 281-88.
Vol. 21:579
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Elmer Jacobs, convicted of robbery in California in 1928. Four
taxicab drivers had been held up and had their cabs stolen by a
pair of robbers over a five day period. Each of the drivers identi-
fied Jacobs as one of the pair. Jacobs had a crooked nose, almond
shaped eyes, tight thin lips, and wavy hair. One would think he
would be easy to recognize. In this instance he was mistaken for
two other men. The real offenders were four men, one pair holding
up three of the drivers, and the other pair holding up the fourth.3 7
While the sixty-five convictions of the innocent listed by
Borchard include some where perjury was committed, it does not
appear that the convictions in the three examples used here were
caused by anything more than honest mistakes in identification.
Jerome Frank reminded us that perjury is not as much a problem
as the "biases of honest witnesses which are not lies but which ac-
count far more for inaccurate testimony than does perjury."88
Frank and Frank 9 also listed cases where faulty eyewitness
identification led to convictions of the innocent, including:
I.L. Southerland and Ovid G. Mathis, convicted of bank robbery
in Texas in 1934. Of five eyewitnesses, three identified Souther-
land and Mathis, one was unable to, and one said they were not
the robbers. One year and a half after the two men had been con-
victed and sent to prison, one of the robbers, Chaplin, confessed
and was presented to the same eyewitnesses. The witness who
could not identify the convicted men also could not identify Chap-
lin. The witness who said the convicted men were not the robbers
correctly identified Chaplin. One of the other three witnesses who
had incorrectly identified the convicted men, changed his position
and identified Chaplin. The other two who had incorrectly identi-
fied the convicted men insisted that Chaplin was not one of the
robbers.40
Ernest Mattice, convicted of rape in Colorado in 1936. Although
he wore a large mustache, Mattice was identified by the victim who
had initially reported to the police that the two men who raped her
were clean shaven."
These foregoing reports, that inaccurate eyewitness testimony
regarding person identification led to improper convictions, reach
only half of the problem. We do not know how often such inaccu-
37. Id. at 340-41.
38. Frank, Judicial Fact-Finding and Psychology, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 186 (1953).
39. J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GumrY (1957).
40. Id. at 40-50.
41. Id. at 50-57.
1983 587
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rate identification leads to acquittal of the guilty. The problem of
inaccurate eyewitness identification of persons has been the sub-
ject of two recent treatises 42 and the focus of considerable experi-
mentation s.4  Apparently little research, at least in the forensic set-
ting, or writing, has been directed at the more general question
which is the topic of this article.
Trial court rulings that extrinsic evidence bearing on a witness'
perception and memory are not admissible are often coupled, in
explanation, with the principle that vigorous cross-examination is
always allowed to test a witness' perception, memory, ability to
narrate, bias, emotion, and veracity. Apart from what such cross-
examination does to the composure of some witnesses, often lead-
ing to bitter feelings about the adversary nature of litigation, it is
possible that the principle itself rests on questionable grounds.
The basis for permitting vigorous cross-examination is that de-
meanor evidence is important to the fact finder. The reluctance of
appellate courts to reverse admission of evidence rulings is also
based on the importance of such demeanor evidence, available to
the trial judge but not to the appellate court. Jerome Frank ad-
dressed the validity of demeanor evidence, particularly that related
to conscious deception:
We know from occasional candid remarks by trial judges that some of them
utilize absurd rules of thumb, such as these: A witness unquestionably lies
who, while testifying, throws back his head; or wipes his hands; or shifts his
gaze rapidly; or bites his lips; or taps steadily on his arm chair.
44
If demeanor evidence is of such little use in the detection of con-
scious deception by trained trial judges, it would seem to have no
use in the detection of honest mistakes and unknown biases by
jurors.
It is here suggested that psychological testimony which might as-
42. B. CLIFFORD & R. BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSON IDENTIFICATION (1978); A.
YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
43. See the studies mentioned in Wells, Lindsay, & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psy-
chological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testi-
mony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275 (1980). Besides raising questions about the validity of the
identifications, some of the studies point out that jurors are misled by the confidence (or
lack of it) of the witness. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1980) suggests that the assumption that eyewitness confidence is a pre-
dictor of eyewitness accuracy is misguided. This assumption underlies the judge's usual in-
structions about evaluating testimony and is probably the base upon which most jurors act.
44. FRANK, supra note 38, at 186. See also G. Miller & J. Burgoon, Factors Affecting
Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, (N. Kerr & R.
Bray eds. 1982), where the authors point out that observers are not very successful in de-
tecting deception in relative strangers.
Vol. 21:579
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sist the fact finder when honest witnesses are mistaken or biased in
unknown ways can be divided into three categories. The first in-
cludes examples of individual differences in perceptual and mem-
ory abilities between classes of witnesses such as men and women,
young and old, field-independent and field-dependent, etc. 45 The
second includes examples of differences in such abilities caused by
transitory environmental factors such as differences in the times
and places of observation, the perception of danger, and the expe-
rience of emotion. The third includes examples such as optical illu-
sions to which all human witnesses are equally fallible.
Powers, Andriks, and Loftus41 provide an example of individual
differences between men and women witnesses. Slides of a wallet
snatching incident were shown to twenty-five men and twenty-five
women. Then, each witness completed a questionnaire testing ac-
curacy of observation, read a suggestibility paragraph designed to
suggest things which were untrue, and completed a final accuracy
questionnaire. Women were better recallers and less susceptible to
suggestion with female oriented items (women's clothing, accesso-
ries, actions, etc.) and men were better recallers and less suscepti-
ble to suggestion with male oriented items. Women were more sus-
ceptible overall to suggestion than were men. This experimental
result could be helpful to a fact finder in resolving contradictions
between the testimony of men and women if the contradictions re-
lated to items which were male or female in nature.
Witryol and Kaess47 reported differences between men and
women in remembering faces. An array of twenty photographs of
faces, half male and half female, was shown to 103 men and 69
women. On a memory test, the men remembered the male faces
better than they did the female, and the women remembered the
female faces better than they did the male.
McGhee i4 reported differences between men and women in voice
identification. Men were better than women at recognizing voices
(84% correct to 59.3% correct) and men were better at recognizing
women's voices than they were at recognizing men's voices (95.5%
correct to 72.5% correct). Women recognized men's voices better
45. See infra note 50.
46. Powers, Andriks, & Loftus, Eyewitness Accounts of Females and Males, 64 J. Ap-
PLIED PSYCHOLOGY 339 (1979).
47. Witryol & Kaess, Sex Differences in Social Memory Tasks, 54 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 343 (1957).




than they did women's voices (72% correct to 46.7% correct).
Two other studies looked for a correlation between ability at fa-
cial memory and personality differences in the field dependence-
independence trait. Messick and Damarin,4 9 using fifty subjects,
ten women and forty men, found that field-dependent persons, as
measured by the embedded figures test,50 were better at recogni-
tion memory of photographed faces than were field-independent
persons. Their subjects were also asked to estimate ages for the
persons photographed, and the persons who thought the persons
photographed were relatively younger remembered better than did
those who thought they were relatively older. Also, memory was
better for narrow categorizers on the Pettigrew-Width Scale than
for broad categorizers.51 However, Hoffman and Kagan, 2 using
fifty-seven subjects, twenty-nine men and twenty-eight women,
found that field-independent men (measured by the embedded
figures test and the Portable Rod-And-Frame Test) 53 remembered
better than did field-dependent men. They obtained the same re-
sult for the women but it was not statistically significant. One dif-
ference in the two studies, apart from Messick and Damarin's mea-
surement on additional independent variables, was that Hoffman
and Kagan used a direct learning paradigm-their subjects knew
that they were to be tested-and Messick and Damarin used an
indirect learning paradigm. Perhaps all that can be safely said
about the two studies is that personality differences as measured
by field dependence-independence do not affect recognition mem-
49. Messick & Damarin, Cognitive Styles and Memory for Faces, 69 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 313 (1964).
50. Field dependence-independence is a dimension of cognitive style or perceptual
mode which indicates how an organized field surrounding an item affects a person's percep-
tion of the item. The embedded-figures test, and the Portable Rod-and-Frame Test are two
tests used to measure the trait. One can think of perception as being analytic (field indepen-
dent) or holistic (field dependent). The trait is a part of one's personality, enduring across
different tasks. One who easily sees an embedded figure will be proficient at picking out a
simple tune hidden in a complex melody. See, Witkin, Moore, Goodenough & Cox, Field-
dependent and Field-independent Cognitive Styles and Their Educational Implication, 47
REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 1 (1977).
51. There is a certain stability in the range or width of a person's cognitive categories.
In making such judgments as the brightness of the grey, the pitch of a voice, the weight of
an object, we tend to be consistent in our category widths relative to the total sample. The
Pettigrew category-width scale is a paper and pencil test designed to measure this dimen-
sion of cognitive style. See Pettigrew, The Measurement and Correlates of Category Width
as a Cognitive Variable, 26 J. PERSONALITY 532 (1958).
52. Hoffman & Kagan, Field Dependence and Facial Recognition, 44 PERCEPTUAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 119 (1977).
53. See supra note 50.
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ory for faces, at least for men. Further research might show that
some personality traits are important in evaluating memory for
faces. Perhaps, also, it makes a difference whether the witness, at
the time of the event, knew that something had happened which
might later require his testimony (analogous to the direct learning
paradigm) rather than not having that impetus to remember. Per-
haps more research would result if researchers knew that their re-
sults could be used in court in appropriate cases.54
Maccoby and Jacklin55 pointed out that, except for the Witryol
and Kaess study56 no evidence has been found for sex differences
in vision or audition. They suggest that this might mean there are
no such sex differences, or it might also mean that less reductionist
methodology should be used. Perhaps presenting one stimulus at a
time ignores too much the contextual character of perception.
Differences in memory ability between the young and the old are
part of our common knowledge. However, Gilbert 7 showed that
memory loss in the aged is a complicated concept. She compared
174 subjects aged sixty to sixty-nine with 174 aged twenty to
twenty-nine on eleven memory tasks. Deficits for the older group
varied from 8.5 percent to 60.4 percent. She also compared the
forty brightest subjects in each group, measuring intelligence by
knowledge of words on the Terman Vocabulary List. Here the defi-
cits for the older group varied from 5.2 percent to 36.3 percent.
When the forty brightest from the older group were compared with
the entire younger group, there were reliable deficits in only four of
the tests, and the older group outperformed the younger in two
other tests. From these findings it would appear appropriate in
some cases to assist the jury with psychological testimony and not
leave it to its common knowledge about memory deficits in the
aged.
There are also age differences in perception. Peripheral vision is
reduced with aging. In addition, the aging lens takes on a yellowish
color as it filters out more blue-violet light, and the person looking
through the lens sees things as less blue than that person did when
54. See Dix & Poythress, Propriety of Medical Dominance of Forensic Mental Health
Practice: The Empirical Evidence, 23 Aniz. L. REV. 961 (1981) where the same chicken-egg
situation is mentioned in another context-the paucity of empirical research bearing on
medical superiority in forensic mental health matters.
55. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974).
56. See supra note 53.
57. Gilbert, Memory Loss in Senescence, 36 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 73
(1941).
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younger. This is why some older women have hair coloring which
appears quite blue to younger people. It looks natural to the
wearer. Vascular changes in the choroid tissue of the eyes contrib-
ute to a decreased sensitivity in poor illumination for older per-
sons. Most older persons suffer from presbyopia, the inability to
focus on near objects, caused by elasticity loss in the lens and in
the muscles which control its curvature. While the fact that many
older persons have a loss of hearing, particularly in the higher fre-
quencies, is also part of our common knowledge, Colavita8 sug-
gests that the loss may not be as great as is generally believed. It
may result from a more conservative approach in responding to a
hearing test, with a reluctance to state that a tone is heard until
the older person is sure.
Young and old differ in the perception of time. Cohen 9 pointed
out that time passes more slowly for younger persons. This can be
demonstrated by asking an older person to determine an elapsed
interval (e.g., thirty seconds). He will underestimate it-report
some period less than thirty seconds.6 0 Such differences in the per-
ception of time could be important if an older witness testified
that two shots were thirty seconds apart and a younger witness
estimated the interval as a minute. A psychologist might assist the
fact finder in resolving what appeared to be a contradiction about
the facts.
Racial differences in the identification of photographed faces
have been studied by psychologists. Malpass and Kravitz" used
forty subjects, half black and half caucasian. The stimuli were
eighty photographs of male faces, half from each race. Twenty
photographs (half from each race) were first presented to each sub-
ject, followed by the entire array, with the subject asked to identify
those he had seen before. Each racial group had a higher acuity for
photographs from the subjects' own race. Had this information
been known at the time and allowed into evidence, Payne Boyd
might have been spared eighteen months in custody and the need
to defend himself in three trials.2
Individual differences in factors less obvious than age, sex, race,
or certain personality traits can also contribute to testimonial dis-
crepancies. For example, there are different kinds of color blind-
58. F. COLAVITA, SENSORY CHANGES IN THE ELDERLY (1978).
59. Cohen, Psychological Time, 211 SCIENTIFIc AM. 116 (Nov. 1964).
60. See Colavita, supra note 58.
61. See supra note 34.
62. Borchard, supra note 32.
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ness. Some people have difficulty distinguishing between red and
green, some between blue and yellow, and some between different
shades of red. Many persons do not know that they have such color
blindness, making their distinctions by considering brightness, or,
with traffic lights, location. If the identification of a color were im-
portant in a trial and if testimonial discrepancies could be resolved
by vision testing of witnesses, it would seem appropriate to do so.
In fact, visual acuity is so variable that vision examinations might
often be more appropriate than vigorous cross-examination with
the frail hope that something will turn up.
The second category of examples where psychological testimony
might help a fact finder includes transitory environmental factors
which affect perception and memory. Two studies show the effect
of an emotional factor, danger to the witness, on perception.
Langer, Wapner, and Werner s studied the effect of danger on the
perception of time. They asked their subjects to estimate when five
seconds had passed. In the danger condition (moving in a riding
cart toward a stairwell precipice while blindfolded) the average re-
port was given after 3.52 seconds. In the non-danger condition it
was 4.11 seconds. Werner and Wapner 4 studied the effect of dan-
ger on the perception of distance. Blindfolded subjects were asked
to walk to a marker they had previously seen. In the danger condi-
tion they walked toward a stage drop precipice. They overesti-
mated the traveled distance in both condtions, just as the subjects
in the other experiment overestimated the passage of time in both
conditions, but the difference between the two conditions was sig-
nificant. They stopped shorter in the danger condition than in the
non-danger condition. One witness may observe a traffic accident
from one of the vehicles involved, another from a less dangerous
position on a nearby sidewalk, and a third from a safe position,
looking out the window of a building. If testimony about times or
distances becomes important, a psychologist might help. Of related
interest is a study6 showing that the perceived loudness of a sound
varies directly with the visually perceived distance to the sound
source. Thus, two witnesses, side by side, hearing the same sound
could give conflicting testimony about the loudness of the sound if
63. Langer, Wapner & Werner, The Effect of Danger Upon the Experience of Time,
74 Am. J. PSYCHOLOGY 94 (Mar. 1961).
64. Werner & Wapner, Changes in Psychological Distance Under Conditions of Dan-
ger, 24 J. PERSONALITY 153 (Sept. 1955).
65. Mershon, Desaulniers, Kiefer, Amerson, & Mills, Perceived Loudness and Visu-
ally-Determined Auditory Distance, 10 PERCEPTION 531 (1981).
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they had conflicting visual perceptions about the distance to the
sound source.
Two studies about the effect of emotion on perception and mem-
ory used an approach directly applicable to problems of courtroom
testimony. Kuehn"6 analyzed reports made to police by the victims
in two homicides, twenty-two rapes, fifteen assaults, and sixty-one
robberies. The robbery victims gave more complete descriptions of
the offenders than did the rape or assault victims. Clifford and
Scott 7 found that the recall of details by witnesses to nonviolent
incidents was better than the recall in violent incidents. These re-
sults suggest an inverse correlation between the completeness of
the report and the emotional involvement of the reporter. Such
findings may be more relevant to investigative procedures than to
the courtroom evaluation of testimony, but some subsidiary find-
ings in the two studies are relevant to individual differences in tes-
timonial credibility. Kuehn found that men provided more com-
plete descriptions than women, and Clifford and Scott confirmed
this for the violent but not for the nonviolent incidents.
The Kuehn, and Clifford and Scott studies are consistent with
earlier reports by Munsterberg 8 and Stern 9 about the effect of
emotion on testimonial accuracy. Greer 70 suggested that these find-
ings of the contribution of excitement and emotion to testimonial
inaccuracy indicate that the hearsay rule exception for spontane-
ous declarations is misguided. He suggested that the rule should be
changed to state that hearsay is inadmissible, particularly that
contained in spontaneous declarations. Of related interest to the
studies of the effect of emotion on testimony is a study 1 showing
that the witnessing of a violent, mentally shocking event produced
retrograde amnesia sufficient to interfere with the recall of events
occurring nearly two minutes before the shocking event. A witness
to a vehicular accident who observed an occupant being crushed
might have amnesia for the color of the traffic light, while another
66. Kuehn, Looking Down a Gunbarrel: Person Perception and Violent Crime, 39
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1159 (1974).
67. Clifford & Scott, Individual and Situational Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, 63
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 352 (1978).
68. See H. MUNSTERBERG, supra note 1.
69. Stern, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 3
(1939).
70. Greer, Anything but the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in Criminal Trials,
11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 145 (Apr. 1971).




witness, at a different location, observing only the collision of the
vehicles and resultant property damage, might remember the de-
tail of the light.
The effect of mental set or expectancy on perception was shown
by Haward.7 2 In an experiment performed for the defense in an
English criminal trial, twelve adults were shown a series of photo-
graphs under different lighting conditions, for different lengths of
time, and with reference to three different questions appropriate to
expectancy. The questions were: What do you see? (neutral condi-
tion); Do you see any crime being committed? (expectant condi-
tion; Some of the pictures portray criminal acts-which ones are
they? (certain conditions). The defendants had been charged with
gross indecency in a public toilet and were arrested by policemen
who had been keeping the toilet under observation. Table 1 shows
the perceptual errors made under the different conditions of expec-
tancy, exposure time, and lighting.
Table 1
The Effect of Expectancy on Perception
Exposure Time: Long Short
Lighting: Light Dark Light Dark
Expectancy:
Neutral 0 5 20 34
Expectant 15 29 41 57
Certain 36 47 61 68
The numbers show the number of perceptual errors.
The maximum in each condition was 120.
It is not clear from the account of the Haward experiment
whether the psychologist was allowed to testify about it, but the
accused were acquitted. If the defense attorney were limited to
cross-examination, as would probably happen in this country, the
fact finder would be unaware of the dramatic linear relationship
between expectancy and perceptual errors across all four combina-
tions of the other independent variables.
Bruner and Postman7 3 presented playing cards tachistoscopically
(very brief and accurately measured intervals of time) to twenty-
72. Haward, The Reliability of Corroborated Police Evidence in a Case Flagrante
Delicto, 3 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE Soc'y 71 (1963) (reported in Greer, supra note 70).




eight subjects in an experiment which showed that perception is
strongly influenced by expectations. Some of the cards were incon-
gruous-red spades and clubs, black hearts and diamonds. Four
types of reactions were observed following presentations of incon-
gruous cards: (1) Dominance - a red spade would be perceived as a
red heart or as a black spade, depending on whether shape or color
dominated. (2) Compromise - the card color might be reported as
green, or purple, or brown. (3) Disruption - the subject was unable
to report that he saw anything. (4) Correct recognition. While it is
not entirely clear from the report, it appears that most of the reac-
tions were of the dominance or compromise types. These, of
course, would produce responses about which the subject was cer-
tain, but in which he was incorrect.
Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies" found that perception de-
pends on the perceiver's interests. Stimuli were recognized quicker
when they related to areas in which the subject was interested.
McGinnies 75 found that neutral words were recognized quicker
than taboo (bitch, rape) words. Ericksen76 suggested that the con-
cepts of perceptual vigilance and perceptual defense, often used to
explain these findings, are inadequate, and that the explanation
lies with response bias. This point would be immaterial with court-
room testimony as the concern there is with the verbal response to
some perceived event. It would be immaterial whether differences
in testimony between a butcher who read lion as a cut of meat and
a zoology student who read loin as an African animal were caused
by perceptual mistakes or response bias. What is important is that
a psychologist could assist the fact finder in evaluating the
testimony.
The influence of the point of observation on perception can be
illustrated by considering the photoreceptors in the retina. The
part of the retina which is stimulated by light coming from periph-
eral areas of the visual field contains many more rod receptors
than cone receptors. 7 Different types of photoreceptors and inter-
mediate bipolar and ganglion cells mean that rods contribute most
to sensitivity (there is something there) and cones contribute most
74. Postman, Bruner & McGinnies, Personal Values as Selective Factors in Percep-
tion, 43 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 142 (1948).
75. McGinnies, Emotionality and Perceptual Defense, 56 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 244
(Sept. 1949).
76. C. Ericksen, Perception and Personality, in CONCEPTS OF PERSONALITY (J.
Wepman & R. Heine eds. 1963).
77, H. SCHIFFMAN, SENSATION AND PERCEPTION: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 164 (1978).
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to acuity (I can tell what it is). Thus, we see most clearly that
which we focus upon and which lies straight ahead if our eyes are
pointing in that direction. But we see better with low levels of illu-
mination when we use the peripheral areas of the visual field. We
"make something out" in near darkness by looking to one side of
it. If an issue in a trial depended on the observations of two wit-
nesses in a dark place, and if one who was looking straight ahead
testified that he saw nothing, but the other testified that he saw
something out of the corner of his eye, a psychologist could assist
in evaluating the testimony. The cone receptors, concentrated in
the center of the retina, are the ones with which we perceive color,
and color cannot be perceived at the edge of the visual field.78 So,
if the two witnesses testified that they could see something, and
the one who was looking straight ahead said it was a yellow, round
object, while the one who was looking to one side said it was a
square, red object, the apparent contradiction in testimony could
be resolved with each witness contributing what his perceptual fac-
ulties permitted. If other evidence established that the object was
square and yellow, the importance of the psychological evidence
would be underscored by its direct opposition to common sense,
supported by jury instructions in some states, that a witness found
truthful in one respect is more likely to be truthful in others.
Another example of different perceptions arising from different
observation points is illustrated by the fact that the perceived
speed of an object may depend upon the size of the frame of refer-
ence surrounding it.79 Thus, a witness observing a moving vehicle
through a narrow window might report a higher speed than would
a witness observing it through a wide window.
The third category of situations where psychological testimony
might help a fact finder can be illustrated with examples of what
might be called individual frailties, rather than individual differ-
ences. Here will be mentioned perceptual defects common to all
persons which might result in discrepancies between testimony and
other non-testimonial evidence. If an observed point is moving too
slowly for the movement to be detected, and if the point is en-
closed within a frame of reference which itself is moving too slowly
for its movement to be detected, sometimes the point will appear
to be moving within the frame. This perception will persist even
78. J. DAVIDOFF, DIFFERENCES IN VISUAL PERCEPTION 3-34 (1975).
79. Brown, The Visual Perception of Velocity, in READINGS IN THE STUDY OF VISUALLY
PERCEIVED MovEMENT 64 (I. Spigel ed. 1965).
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though the absolute movement of the frame exceeds that of the
point. This phenomenon is sometimes called the moon illusion and
it appears when the moon is framed by clouds. Even though the
clouds' movement is too slow to be detected, and even though the
absolute movement of the clouds exceeds that of the moon, the
moon will appear to move through the clouds. A similar induced
movement illusion might result from observing some machine part.
If the witness' testimony is inconsistent with physical evidence
from the machine, a psychologist might save the witness from be-
ing discredited.
It is common knowledge that we must adapt to sudden changes
in illumination. We all know that it takes some time to see well
after entering a dark theater, and that it takes some time to see
well after coming out again into the bright light. However, it might
take a psychologist to explain that adaptation to light takes only a
minute or two, while the adaptation to near darkness takes from
thirty to forty minutes.8 0
The final example in the third category is another optical illu-
sion. If a line moves at an angle across a fairly narrow aperture and
if the ends of the line are not visible, the perceived direction of
movement is ambiguous. The direction may be perceived as a par-
allel to the long axis of the aperature, parallel to the short axis, or
as perpendicular to the line. Sometimes there appear to be sudden
changes in the perceived movement. However, there is a tendency
to perceive the movement as parallel to the long axis of the aper-
ture.8 This perceptual phenomenon would be an example of the
second category if one witness observed a moving edge on some
part of a machine through a partially open venetian blind and an-
other observed it through a door, slightly ajar. The first would
probably report horizontal movement and the second, vertical
movement.
Considering (1) the many ways that psychological evidence could
help in the evaluation of testimony; (2) Wigmore's prediction that
when the psychologist was ready for the courts, the courts would
be ready for him; (3) the uncontradicted fact that injustices have
resulted from the lack of such evidence; and (4) the recent adop-
tion of Rule 70282 in about half of the states, a rule which would
appear to welcome such evidence, one might wonder why this par-
80. J. Davidoff, supra note 78, at 9.
81. H. WALLACH, ON PERCEFIriON 85-97 (1976).
82. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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ticular union between psychology and the law has been so barren.
Fishman83 reminded us that the psychology of testimony was one
of the first research areas in applied social psychology. He sug-
gested that the reason it almost disappeared was not because law-
yers were uninterested, but because psychologists became less in-
terested as their attentions turned to broader areas such as
perception, motivation, and personality. From the perspective of
one who practiced law for twenty years and then turned to the for-
mal study of psychology, it appears that the barren union results
from the courts' underestimation of the psychologists' expertise,
and the psychologists' underestimation of the courts' problems.
Unfortunately, all psychologists do not share Fishman's under-
standing that the lawyer's function differs so markedly from the
psychologist's. The psychologist "knows" that the stress of cross-
examination does not contribute to testimonial accuracy. The law-
yer "knows" that the ordeal of cross-examination is often neces-
sary to ascertain the truth. It is suggested that these two state-
ments can be reconciled if two things are remembered.
First, if the psychologist's statement refers to a witness perfect
in perception, memory, and narrative ability, and undefiled by
emotion or bias, the court would agree that cross-examination was
unnecessary. Assuming such facts would be folly as the psycholo-
gist should be the first to know. Second, the "truth" sought in a
trial is not some revealed, absolute truth. It is more like an experi-
ential statement about the facts which contributes to the most just
result possible between the trial litigants, keeping in mind more
global considerations about the historical continuity of the law, the
benefit of predictability, and the desirability of an objective gov-
ernment of laws. Within this practical framework, how might the
union of psychology and law be made more productive as it applies
to problems of testimonial credibility?
First, it is suggested that lawyers who offer psychological evi-
dence solely to call attention to the vagaries of eyewitness testi-
mony will probably not fare well. They have not so far.84 It is true
that perception is a selective process, and is much more than the
mere response to stimuli. In fact, Brown and Lenneberg85 point out
that different linguistic communities organize perceptions in differ-
83. Fishman, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13(2) J.
Soc. IssuEs 60 (1957).
84. See supra notes 15, 20 and accompanying text.




ent ways. Perceptual reality may be different for one who speaks a
different language. Also, memory is a constructive, not merely a
reproductive, process.8 6 As Neisser states, "[s]eeing, hearing, and
remembering are all acts of construction, which may make more or
less use of stimulus information depending on the circum-
stances.""7 But it does not help a fact finder to be told that percep-
tion is a constructive process or that memories are fleeting.88 If in-
stead, evidence is offered to resolve contradictions between
witnesses or inconsistencies between a witness and other non-testi-
monial evidence, that evidence would help the fact finder and
would more likely be admitted.
Second, a distinction should probably be drawn, at least for the
present, between testimonial credibility and witness credibility.
That is, psychological evidence would more likely be admitted if
limited to a particular observation or portion of testimony and not
directed to the witness and all of his testimony. 9 Evidence as to
witness credibility is admitted in some European countries.
Trankell,90 in discussing the fact that psychologists are allowed to
testify about a witness' credibility in Sweden, drew a distinction
between a colleague's method of establishing the reliability of a
wtiness by a personality appraisal and his own method of assessing
the reliability of particular statements made by the witness. It is
possible that after a successful experience in admitting psychologi-
cal testimony about the credibility of particular assertions our
courts may permit it for witness credibility as well, particularly
since the latter has been admissible in some jurisdictions in sex
crime cases.91 However, as Trankell contends, limiting the psychol-
ogist to testimonial credibility may be better in some cases than
allowing him to testify about witness credibility.
There appear to be ways that psychologists can help courts,
other than by testifying about testimonial credibility. One will be
86. F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING 204 (1932).
87. U. NEISSER, COGNrrIvE PSYCHOLOGY 10 (1967).
88. See B. CLIFFORD & R. BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSON IDENTIFICATION (1978); A.
YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979) for thorough discussions on the
vagaries of eyewitness testimony.
89. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of Expert Testimony on
Jurors, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 297 (1980) would limit the psychologist even more. He warns
against "speculation" about the accuracy of a particular eyewitness and suggests that expert
testimony be limited to information about variables which influence accuracy in general.
90. A. Trankell, Case Report: Was Lars Sexually Assaulted? A Study in the Reliabil-
ity of Witnesses and of Experts, 56 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 385 (1958).
91. See supra notes 11-12.
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mentioned briefly because it relates to testimonial accuracy. Psy-
chological research about the relative merits of free narration and
question and answer techniques for obtaining information from
witnesses has been going on since 1909. Whipple92 reported that
the interrogatory form increased the range of material elicited by
fifty percent over the narrative form but also increased inaccura-
cies by as much as 550 percent. Morgan93 agreed, finding that the
interrogatory form was more vulnerable to suggestion, and the nar-
rative form was more accurate in details. However, Cady,e4 while
agreeing that narration was most accurate, disagreed on the best
form to elicit the greatest range of material, finding that narration
was also best there. Most courts would agree that accuracy is en-
hanced with narration which is free from the suggestibility of lead-
ing questions, those questions which either suggest the desired an-
swer or assume facts not proven. However, the interrogatory form
is necessary to maintain control over the witness, and to prevent
injection into the trial of irrelevant and unduly prejudicial mate-
rial. Courts decrease the danger of suggestibility-caused inaccuracy
by prohibiting leading questions. A psychologist could assist a
court by minimizing the suggestibility in questions, particularly
those addressed to children. For example, Dale, Loftus, and Rath-
bun9 5 found that the definite article increased suggestibility-did
you see the dog/did you see a dog? Other studies on suggestibility
show the interaction between the language of the question and the
perception or memory being elicited. Witnesses who examined
filmed automobile accidents and were then asked the question:
"About how fast were the cars going when they (verb) each other?"
gave these mean speed estimates for these verbs:96
92. Whipple, The Observer as Reporter: A Survey of the Psychology of Testimony, 6
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 153 (1909).
93. Morgan, A Study in the Psychology of Testimony, 8 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. 222
(1917). See also, State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980) for a psychiatrist's
view that the same results occur under hypnosis.
94. Cady, On the Psychology of Testimony, 35 Am. J. PSYCHOLOGY 110 (1924).
95. Dale, Loftus & Rathbun, The Influence of the Form of the Question on Eyewit-
ness Testimony of Preschool Children, 7 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH 269 (1978).
96. Loftus & Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the









Rouke'97 mentioned a Belgian trial in which psychological testi-
mony was allowed on the effect of suggestive questioning of wit-
nesses, including the results of an experiment designed around the
questions used in the trial and carried out with peers of the chil-.
dren witnesses. The trial occurred in 1911 and there is no indica-
tion whether such evidence would be admissible in Belgium today.
Whether courts in this country ever permit psychologists to de-
sign and testify about experiments such as the Belgian example is
of less immediate importance than the problem that fact finders
are not getting the expert help they need to resolve testimonial
contradictions based on perceptual and memory defects. Jerome
Frank, in a list of suggested reforms, advocated the use of "non-
partisan 'testimonial experts' called by the judge to testify con-
cerning the detectible fallibilities of witnesses." ' s Considering the
emphasis on precedent, the difficulty of doing this in some courts
should not be underestimated. Davidson"9 pointed out that delu-
sions of marital infidelity and impairment of memory often charac-
terize senile psychosis. If an elderly witness in an accident case
were thought to be a senile psychotic, one can imagine the reaction
of an unprepared trial judge to an offer of extrinsic evidence that
the witness thought his wife unfaithful. Yet, with supporting ex-
pert testimony, it would appear that the evidence would assist the
jury and be appropriate as to possible memory impairment accom-
panying senile psychosis. This example also illustrates the futility
of relying on cross-examination for this kind of impeachment. No
lawyer would ask the question because he would look so foolish
when he obtained the expected, deceptive answer. Even if he ob-
tained a truthful answer, expert testimony would be needed to ex-
plain its meaning.
The importance of admitting psychological evidence about
perceptual and memory factors affecting testimonial credibility is
clear when one considers the case of William Lindley, convicted of
97. Rouke, Psychological Research on Problems of Testimony, 13 J. Soc. IssuEs 50
(1957).
98. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 422 (1950).
99. Davidson, Appraisal of the Witness, 110 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 481 (1954).
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first degree rape-murder in California in 1943. Lindley, forty-nine
years old and unable to read, was convicted on the evidence of one
eyewitness. The witness, a sixteen-year-old sheepherder, observed
the crime from a distance of six or seven hundred feet across a
river. He testified in detail about the colors of the murderer's
clothing and hair. After the conviction was affirmed' 0 and Lindley
sought release by a writ of habeas corpus, the California Supreme
Court appointed a referee to take additional evidence. The referee
found that the eyewitness had an IQ between forty and fifty and
was color blind.10' Pointing out the procedural limitations affecting
the remedy sought, the court declined to release Lindley but sug-
gested that he might want to ask the governor, who had already
commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment, for further
consideration. Three of the seven members of the court stated that
they "had a grave doubt as to whether Lindley is guilty."'02 Appar-
ently Lindley went insane and remained insane until his death in
prison.10 3
100. People v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 161 P.2d 227 (1945).
101. In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947).
102. Id. at 729, 177 P.2d at 930.
103. E. GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1952).
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